Each source gets an Admiralty (NATO STANAG 2511) reliability letter plus a 0–100% score. Each claim gets an information-credibility digit.
In notes, claims are tagged like (C3, [[Sahel Monitor]], t.me/sahelmonitor/505, 19 Oct 2026): source letter + credibility digit, source note, post, post date.
Score rubric (0–100)
| Factor | Points | Scale |
|---|---|---|
| Affiliation / propaganda incentive | 0–25 | independent professional 25 · independent anonymous 15 · state/party outlet 5 · influence operation 0 |
| Access | 0–20 | firsthand with named sources 20 · own-forces firsthand 15–20 · mixed 12 · aggregator 8 · relay of party claims 4 |
| Verifiability | 0–15 | coordinates, dates, geolocatable media 15 · dated but unlocated 8 · undated, unlocated 3 |
| Corroboration in spot-checks | 0–30 | 30 × (hits + 0.5 × partials) / checkable claims; capped at 15 if fewer than 5 checkable claims |
| Fabrication history | 0–10 | none known 10 · errors corrected 7 · unretracted inflation or recycled claims 3 · documented fabrication 0 |
Score → letter: A ≥85 · B 70–84 · C 50–69 · D 30–49 · E <30 · F cannot be judged (too little data, or not reviewed). Party channels get split scores by claim type (e.g. own-forces activity vs casualty and enemy claims), scored separately with the same factors. The overall score is the split scores weighted by how much of the channel’s output each claim type makes up, and the letter follows it.
Information credibility (per claim)
1 confirmed · 2 probably true · 3 possibly true · 4 doubtful · 5 improbable · 6 cannot be judged A digit is upgraded when an independent outlet (graded B or better) confirms the claim. Repeated reposts by the same channel, or relays by allied channels, are not corroboration.
Monitored channels
| Source | Access | Letter | % | Split |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sahel Monitor | Reviewed: 192 posts, 30 Aug – 20 Oct 2026 | C | 62 | |
| Africa Corps (official channel) | Reviewed: 88 posts (~44 after removing FR duplicates), 28 Aug – 20 Oct 2026 | D | 35 | own-forces activity: 50%; casualty & enemy claims: 15% |
| Departamente | Reviewed: 125 posts, 29 Aug – 20 Oct 2026 | D | 40 | event relay: 48%; attribution & geopolitical framing: 15% |
| Belye Dyadi v Afrike (wagner_group2022) | Reviewed: 184 posts, 29 Aug – 20 Oct 2026 (~60 Sahel-relevant) | D | 35 | own-side & event relay: 38%; casualty & enemy claims: 15% |
| Sahel Alerte (X) | Not reviewed: posts not available for systematic review (20 Oct 2026) | F | 30 | |
| Faytuks News Discord (west-africa-sahel) | Reviewed: 200 messages = 142 after merging member-link/bot-embed pairs, 1–9 Aug 2026 only | C | 55 | wire & press relays: 75%; X monitor relays: 52%; party-claim relays (JNIM, FAMa, Africa Corps): 23% |
| African Initiative | Desk grade (event lists of 3–16 Oct 2026) | D | 30 | event lists: 35%; framing & attribution: 10% |
| Sahel control map (Google My Maps) | Reviewed: snapshot of 21 Oct 2026 | C | 58 | general presence (a group operates in the area): 62%; current control of a specific town: 49% |
Outlets cited in the situation report
| Outlet | Letter | % | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|
| ACLED | B | 82 | Systematic event coding from media and local partners; transparent method, but limited by its inputs and lagging. |
| AFP / Reuters / AP (incl. ABC/AP) | B | 82 | Professional wires with named or security sources; usually relay official tolls, constrained by access bans in the AES. |
| RFI | B | 75 | Strong Sahel desk and phone sourcing, but banned in Mali, Burkina and Niger; Russian channels contest its framing. |
| Janes / Rane (Worldview) | B | 80 | Professional analysis; secondary sourcing but careful about attribution. |
| ISS Africa | B | 80 | Regional think tank with field research; analytic rather than event reporting. |
| Africa Center (ACSS) | B | 75 | US DoD-funded; good data synthesis (ACLED-based), US-policy lens. |
| Foreign Policy / Atlantic Council | B | 70 | Analysis and opinion; reliable facts, argued conclusions. |
| Africanews | B | 70 | Euronews-owned; mostly wire-based. |
| African Security Analysis | C | 60 | Small analytic outlet; plausible, thinly sourced. |
| ADF Magazine | C | 60 | Published by US AFRICOM; accurate on facts it cites, but government messaging. |
| Wikipedia (2026 Mali offensives / 2026 in Niger) | C | 60 | Tertiary; only as good as each footnote. Check citations before using a figure. |
| Mondafrique | C | 55 | French outlet with jihadist-milieu sources; scoops mixed with sensationalism. |
| Democrata / SOFREP / Opscon | C | 50 | Secondary aggregation and commentary; fine for the gist, weak for numbers. |
| NTA (Nigerian state TV) | C | 55 | Accurate on attacks the army admits; inflates enemy losses and under-reports its own. |
| FDD | C | 55 | Advocacy think tank, hawkish on Turkey; the SADAT claims rest on SOHR and Jeune Afrique. |
| Afrik.com | C | 50 | Pan-African web outlet; uneven sourcing. |
| @BrantPhilip_ (X) | C | 55 | Independent Sahel analyst; often cites single ‘local sources’. |
| Truth Nigeria | D | 35 | Advocacy outlet (Christian-persecution framing); casualty and attribution claims are often unsupported. |
Grades for existing outlets are desk assessments (method, ownership, known errors), not new spot-checks; channel grades rest on the spot-checks listed in each source note.